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By 2012, South Korean firms employed more than 50,000 workers in North 
Korea. This paper examines whether their employment practices are likely to 
encourage North Korea’s transition. Survey data indicate that the North Korean 
government has successfully circumscribed exposure of North Korean citizens 
both to South Koreans and to more market-oriented economic practices. South 
Korean investment in North Korea may well be beneficial both for the firms 
and the workers involved, but evidence of the sort of broader spillovers that 
proponents of engagement sometimes assert is not evident. The possibility 
of using voluntary labor codes to promote transformation is then examined.
JEL: J8, F2, J47, P33 
Keywords: labor, labor standards, voluntary codes, special economic zones, 
South Korea, North Korea
North Korea has a dysfunctional economy, an abysmal human rights record, and a belligerent 
foreign policy. A standard theme of North-South relations is that increased cross-border exchange 
will contribute to an improvement in the North Korean economy, ultimately promoting a lessening 
of internal repression and a moderation of the country’s foreign policy. 
This argument often rests on unexamined assumptions about the nature of economic 
engagement, specifically the extent to which engagement fosters market-orientation and 
reduces direct state control over the economy. It is possible that by giving rise to a middle class, 
by providing influential factions an enhanced stake in external economic relations, and/or by 
strengthening interest groups within the polity that have such stakes, an expansion of cross-
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border economic integration could generate the desired alteration in state preferences and 
behavior. But it is also the case that the incumbent power structure may also understand the 
implications of such processes and act to forestall or blunt their impact.
One issue missing from this discussion is the actual conditions under which workers are 
employed by foreign investors in North Korea. The picture is not very appealing. According to 
survey data presented below, only one in five South Korean firms investing in North Korea even 
knows how much its workers are paid. Entirely missing from the discussion of engagement is 
whether these employment practices are consistent with various international agreements and 
covenants to which the governments of North and South Korea have committed, and whether 
these or other voluntary labor standards initiatives such as the Global Sullivan Principles, which 
have been applied in other situations of controversy, could be used to achieve the desired 
transformational effects.
Using survey data on South Korean firms operating in North Korea, this paper examines whether 
the employment practices of South Korean firms conform to this transformational vision and are 
likely to play a role in encouraging North Korea’s evolution in the desired directions. Over the past 
two decades there has been a considerable expansion in North-South economic interaction, and 
by 2012, South Korean firms were employing more than 50,000 workers in North Korea.
North Korea presents a challenging business environment, and foreign firms respond by 
hedging risks in a variety of ways, including favoring trade over investment (which is subject 
to expropriation). As a consequence, only a minority of foreign firms doing business with North 
Korea establishes local facilities (Haggard, Lee, and Noland 2012; Haggard and Noland 2012a). 
In the case of South Korea, the particular history of North-South relations has resulted in a 
situation in which exchange occurs through three quite distinct modalities.
When cross-border integration began in the 1990s, while some trade (mainly the importation of 
North Korean natural resource products) took the form of arm’s-length transactions—that is to 
say exchange between independent, unrelated buyers and sellers—the majority of trade took the 
form of a processing-on-commission (POC) arrangement. Under this arrangement, South Korean 
firms shipped inputs to North Korea for assembly by North Korean partners, with the finished 
products re-exported for sale in South Korea or other third country markets. A typical example 
would involve South Korean garment manufacturers transshipping cut cloth, buttons, and thread 
through China to North Korea, where the components would be sewn into shirts and then re-
exported back through China for sale outside North Korea. 
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A third modality of exchange subsequently developed at the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC). 
The zone, which opened in December 2004, sits just north of the North-South border and is 
easily accessible from Seoul. It was closed in a diplomatic dispute in April 2013, but reopened 
in September 2013. Firms in the KIC are engaged in processing and assembly activities. Inputs 
are sourced from South Korea, transported to the KIC, fabricated into finished products by North 
Korean workers, and then transported back to South Korea for sale there or in third-country 
markets. Financial terms on which these exchanges occur indicate that the activity at the KIC, 
undertaken with considerable South Korean government support, is the least risky, followed by, 
in terms of increasing risk, POC exchange and arm’s-length transactions (Haggard and Noland 
2012b). Given the differences in degree of exposure to the North Korean policy environment, it 
would be reasonable to expect that employment practices may vary across the three modalities 
as well.
Survey data on South Korean employers indicate that the North Korean government has in 
large part successfully circumscribed exposure of North Korean citizens both to South Koreans 
and to new, more market-oriented economic practices. Hiring is largely conducted via the North 
Korean government, which pre-screens workers (possibly on political criteria), sets wage rates 
administratively, demands payment in foreign currency, and takes a large cut. South Korean 
managers typically do not interact directly with North Korean employees, but rather manage 
them through North Korean intermediaries who effectively represent state interests in monitoring 
and exercising control over workers. And even in firms that report direct supervision of workers, 
there is little statistical correlation with knowledge of working conditions or worker attitudes. In a 
narrow economic sense, South Korean investment in North Korea may well be beneficial both for 
the firms and the workers involved, but there is no evidence of broader spillovers of the sort that 
proponents of engagement sometimes assert. 
This paper then considers whether these practices are consistent with various international 
agreements and covenants to which the governments of North and South Korea have committed, 
and whether these or other voluntary initiatives could be used to encourage employment 
practices more likely to generate the desired transformation of the North.
Who Are the Respondents? 
The results reported here are derived from a survey of 250 firms conducted between November 
2009 and March 2010. Of those firms, 200 had been engaged in trade or investment in North 
Korea, and 50 were selected as a control group. As there are no public business registries 
listing firms engaged in business with North Korea, these firms necessarily constitute a sample 
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of convenience, culled from a variety of sources. However, extensive interviews suggest that 
the sample is broadly representative of the cross-border business. At its peak in the late 2000s, 
roughly 400 South Korean firms were engaged in economic activities in the North outside of 
KIC; activity at Kaesong peaked in 2013 with 123 firms and has since declined. At the time it 
was undertaken, the survey sampled more than half the universe of South Korean firms doing 
business in North Korea.1 As noted in the introduction, North Korea is a very risky business 
environment and only a minority of foreign participants establishes local facilities. Of the 200 firms 
doing business in North Korea, 46 reported employing North Korean workers. 
The sub-sample which reports employing North Korean labor is engaged in importing, exporting, 
and investment, either through arm’s-length transactions, POC trade, and/or the KIC. The 
permutations and combinations of these three activities are diagrammed in figure 1. Most of the 
firms, 33 of 46, or 72 percent, operate in the KIC, though not necessarily exclusively there. Most 
firms engage in some kind of processing trade; eight firms or 17 percent, engage in POC trade 
outside the KIC. A handful of firms are engaged exclusively in arm’s-length importing or exporting, 
and one firm engages in both arm’s-length importing and exporting activities; nonetheless, they 
have at least some North Korean employees.
Among those firms operating outside the KIC, the most frequent counterparties are North Korean 
state-owned enterprises (38 percent), other sorts of North Korean organizations, including 
government entities and agricultural cooperatives (25 percent), followed by foreign enterprises 
(i.e. non-DPRK enterprises) (17 percent), and others (21 percent). 
Nearly half of the firms (43 percent) are involved in textiles and apparel. Of the remainder, 
watches, parts, and accessories (13 percent); natural resource products (9 percent); machinery, 
motors, and parts (9 percent); and electronic parts (9 percent) are the most frequent lines 
of business. Apart from in the KIC, the respondent firms have operations in the capital city, 
Pyongyang, and in North Hamgyong, North Pyongan, and Gangwon provinces. Almost by 
definition, the natural resource based businesses mostly involve arm’s-length transactions 
occurring outside the KIC. 
Employment Practices 
It is important at the outset to draw an important distinction between South Korean firms that 
employ North Korean workers and those that actually hire North Koreans; this itself is highly 
revealing. Only one of the 46 firms reported hiring workers directly; the vast majority reported 
1  See Appendix A for methodological details.
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hiring via a North Korean government labor agency, and this was the almost exclusive means 
of hiring for operations in the KIC (table 1). The only other avenue of hiring that received a 
noticeable response was that North Korean partners supplied the workers (11 percent overall). 
This channel of hiring labor was correlated at the 1 percent level with firms engaged in arm’s-
length transactions and those involved in the natural resources sector. 
When the South Korean employers were asked if they believed that their workers had to pay their 
North Korean counterparties bribes or kickbacks for the privilege of working for the South Korean 
employer, a plurality of firms responded negatively, though 60 percent of those obtaining their 
labor via North Korean counterparties (significant at the 1 percent level) said they believed this to 
be the case. When asked if they were required to employ members of the Korean Workers’ Party 
(KWP), most firms said no, though 27 percent of the firms operating in the KIC indicated that they 
were forced to employ KWP members. But these responses obscure the fact that the firms do not 
hire labor directly; if North Korean entities are responsible for actual hiring decisions, then it is the 
policies of those hiring agencies, not the firms, that are relevant. 
When asked about wage rates, perhaps not surprisingly, the overwhelming response (83 percent 
overall, 94 percent within the KIC, and 54 percent outside the KIC) was that wage rates were set 
by the North Korean government. Other responses included wages being set by North Korean 
partners (9 percent overall, and 60 percent for the firms engaged in arm’s-length transactions) 
or by the South Korean government or supply-and-demand (4 percent each). Similarly, the 
vast majority of firms reported paying wages to the North Korean government and not the 
workers directly (93 percent overall, 97 percent in the KIC, and 85 percent outside the KIC); 4 
percent reported paying workers directly, and one firm operating in the KIC said it both paid the 
government and paid the workers directly. These findings are significant because they underscore 
a point examined further below: that the wage payment going to workers is actually unknown.
This fact is buttressed when we consider that wages were overwhelmingly paid in US dollars 
or other foreign currency (93 percent overall, 100 percent in the KIC, 81 percent outside it, and 
100 percent for the arm’s-length group), although it is technically illegal for domestic residents 
to hold foreign exchange. One POC firm indicated that it paid wages in North Korean won, and 
extraordinarily, another POC operation claimed that it paid wages in South Korean won.
At the time of its closure in April 2013, the minimum wage at the KIC was $67.05 per month, and 
once all payments and bonuses were accounted for, the average wage was $130.2 Workers, 
however, were not receiving the full $130 per month; the North Korean government was thought 
2  Seong Guk Park, “Kaesong Wages Rise by 5%,” DailyNK, August 6, 2012, http://www.dailynk.com/english/
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to retain roughly 30 to 40 percent of this payment, ostensibly to cover social security payments, 
transportation, and other in-kind benefits. More importantly, while South Korean firms pay in US 
dollars, North Korea pays the workers in North Korean won converted at the wildly overvalued 
official exchange rate. Evaluated at the more realistic black-market rate, North Korean workers 
may have been netting less than $2 per month (if the entire dollar amount were converted into 
won at the black market exchange rate). Alternatively, market prices for rice have been on the 
order of 4,000 to 5,000 (North Korean) won per kilo, suggesting that monthly after tax wages 
might purchase roughly 2 to 3 kilos of rice.3 These figures imply that the real wages of KIC 
workers are low. Nevertheless, while conditions in Kaesong may be exploitative, they probably 
are considerably better than those existing elsewhere in North Korea, and there appears to be no 
shortage of North Koreans willing to work on these terms.
In short, hiring is largely via the North Korean government, which prescreens the workers, sets 
wage rates administratively, demands payment in foreign currency, and absorbs the lion’s share 
of wage payments.
However, there is some evidence of incentive pay (table 2). While most respondents indicated 
that they paid salaries on the basis of a set daily or hourly wage rate, 22 percent reported paying 
overtime, 15 percent reported paying a piecework rate, and 7 percent reported paying bonuses 
for exceeding production targets. Consistent with relatively greater regulatory oversight and 
more direct North Korean government pecuniary interest, overtime is paid more frequently in 
the KIC (27 percent versus 8 percent outside), but piecework is more common outside the KIC 
(23 percent versus 12 percent inside). Half the POC firms, and nearly half of the KIC operations, 
use some kind of incentive pay. Yet, as shown below, it appears that the incentive payments go 
to the North Korean counterparty. It is unclear how much incentive pay, if any, actually reaches 
the workers. And if incentives are operating, they may be operating indirectly via North Korean 
management.
No firms reported paying tips. This is slightly amusing insofar as Choco-Pies, a South Korean 
snack similar to American Moon Pies, emerged as a kind of parallel currency in the city of 
Kaesong. Originally providing Choco-Pies to workers as a snack, South Korean firms, unable to 
vary wage rates or reward particularly productive workers, began using extra allocations of the 
snacks as a way to lure workers away from their competitors. (The cakes circulated as a kind 
of parallel currency in the environs of Kaesong, so that providing workers with extra cakes that 
read.php?cataId=nk00100&num=9633 (accessed November 7, 2013).
3  Based on figures for December 2013. See DailyNK, “North Korea Market Trends,” http://www.dailynk.com/
english/market.php (accessed January 29, 2014).
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could be sold outside the KIC effectively amounted to granting them a bonus.4) The North Korean 
government became sufficiently concerned over these developments that in November 2011, 
North Korean officials, the South Korean KIC management committee, and the employers agreed 
to rules to limit the distribution of the snacks. Choco-Pie rules were on the agenda when North 
and South Korea negotiated the reopening of KIC after its closure in 2013. 
Given that wages are usually paid to the North Korean government, the firms hiring via the 
government were asked if they knew exactly how much money their workers were in turn 
receiving from the government. A majority of the employers refused to answer the question. 
Of those that did, their responses were split nearly evenly between those that said they knew 
(21 percent) and those that said they did not (18 percent). In other words, only one in five firms 
indicated that they knew how much their workers were actually paid. Remarkably, none of the 
firms that reported paying piecework rates indicated that they knew how much the workers were 
paid—they simply paid their North Korean counterparty and left it at that. However, when asked 
the follow-up question whether they believed that the government took a large amount of money 
that was supposed to go to their employees, a majority responded affirmatively (76 percent 
overall, 77 percent in the KIC, 71 percent outside the KIC). The implication is that those firms 
claiming to be paying piecework wages cannot know for sure if they actually are. 
In sum, it appears that operations in the KIC are more bureaucratized or controlled than activities 
outside the zone. Hiring is done through a state agency, wages are set administratively, and the 
state takes a substantial cut of wage payments. Given that the state gets a cut of the wages, 
it has a direct incentive to negotiate and enforce generous overtime bonuses. But it is unclear 
how these overtime bonuses are shared between the workers and the state (if at all). Yet while 
operations outside KIC may not be subject to the same degree of state scrutiny, the state appears 
to continue to dominate basic hiring and payment practices in these other modalities as well. 
Industrial Relations
South Korean managers generally do not directly supervise North Korean workers. Supervision 
is normally done through a North Korean intermediary manager. This holds true for KIC, POC, 
and arm’s-length relationships, inside or outside of the KIC. Some firms, however, did report 
that either their managers directly supervised North Korean workers or used both indirect and 
direct supervision. Direct supervision occurred more frequently outside of the KIC (15 percent). 
However, if one combines the firms that indicated that they used direct supervision with those 
4  Marcus Noland, “A superior currency comes to the Kaesong Industrial Complex,” North Korea: Witness to 
Transformation, November 30,  http://blogs.piie.com/nk/?p=3882 (accessed March 3, 2014).
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that responded that they used both direct and indirect supervision, then the percentage in the KIC 
(42 percent) is nearly double that outside of it (23 percent). That is, firms outside the KIC tend to 
either supervise their workers directly or not at all; those inside the KIC also mostly do not directly 
supervise their workers, but if they do, it is in combination with North Korean management, 
perhaps reflecting greater regimentation within the KIC. 
The lack of direct supervision appears to come at a cost: most South Korean firms agreed that 
it was difficult to supervise North Korean workers, but this seemed to be a bigger issue in the 
KIC (statistically significant at the 5 percent level), where firms tend to rely on the intermediation 
of North Korean managers. Apparently supervision via North Korean intermediaries is a highly 
imperfect substitute for direct supervision. This may come from the fact that the North Korean 
intermediaries are not individuals who are assigned to Kaesong because of any managerial 
expertise, but who essentially play a political function; indeed, it is plausible that such 
intermediaries reduce the efficiency of Kaesong businesses, as has been reported anecdotally 
with respect to other foreign-invested businesses.
Most South Korean employers surveyed had generally positive appraisals of their North Korean 
workers (figure 2). When asked if the North Korean workers had adequate skills, a majority 
responded affirmatively (54 percent), but firms operating outside the KIC had more positive 
assessments (62 percent) than those operating within the KIC, which were split between those 
indicating that the North Koreans had an adequate skill level (54 percent) and those saying they 
did not (43 percent). Disturbingly, firms in which managers directly supervised North Korean 
workers were more likely to say that they did not have adequate skills (59 percent). 
When asked to compare the skill level of North Korean labor relative to Chinese, Vietnamese, or 
other foreign workers, the consensus among most of the South Korean employers was that North 
Korean workers had a comparable level of skill (89 percent overall, 91 percent in the KIC, and 85 
percent outside the KIC). When asked the bottom line question of whether, given the skill level, 
the employment of the North Koreans was advantageous at the prevailing wage rates, again, 
large majorities answered affirmatively (91 percent overall).
As figure 3 shows, relatively few firms acknowledged that workers complained about conditions 
in their South Korean-operated factories (15 percent overall, 18 percent in the KIC, and 8 percent 
outside the KIC). There was no correlation between direct supervision or the use of both direct 
and indirect supervision and responding that workers complained (i.e., the pattern of responses 
indicating a lack of complaints did not appear to reflect lack of familiarity or contact). In fact, 
large majorities (80 percent overall) indicated that they thought that their employees considered 
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themselves lucky to be employed by South Korean firms. This general acceptance of working 
conditions seems to be borne out by low turnover rates: 76 percent of the respondents indicated 
that a benefit of hiring North Korean workers was that the percentage that quit was low (79 
percent of respondents in the KIC and 69 percent of the firms outside the KIC). 
When asked how they handled situations involving unsatisfactory or unnecessary workers, 28 
percent responded that they had never confronted this problem, including half of the POC firms 
(table 3). For the POC firms that make piecework payments to their North Korean counterparties, 
this result may reflect the internalization of the pecuniary incentive of the North Korean 
counterparty management to weed out unproductive workers. The counterparty takes care of this 
function.
Among the firms that did acknowledge needing to dismiss workers, none said that they were able 
to do so without obtaining some kind of approval or permission. The majority of firms that reported 
making dismissals (77 percent) said that they had to get the permission of the North Korean labor 
agency to dismiss a worker, 10 percent said that they had to get permission from the KWP, and 
another 10 percent said that they had to get permission from their North Korean partner. One firm 
reported paying severance. Out of the firms that had dismissed workers, all but one reported that 
their method of replacement was to go back to either the state labor agency or their North Korean 
partner and ask for another worker.
Work stoppages appear to occur infrequently: most firms reported that they had not experienced 
strikes or work stoppages (83 percent overall, 88 percent in the KIC, and 69 percent outside the 
KIC; 75 percent for POC firms and 60 percent for arm’s-length firms). Among those firms that 
had experienced labor unrest, there appeared to be no standard method of dispute resolution. 
Some in the KIC (though none outside of it) appealed to the South Korean government or the 
North Korean government. The POC firms that experienced strikes or work stoppages most often 
appealed to their Chinese office or a Korean Chinese intermediary for help. Other employers 
indicated no method of settling disputes at all.5 When the South Korean employers were asked if 
a benefit of hiring North Korean workers was that they were not unionized, 61 percent responded 
affirmatively (58 percent in the KIC and 69 percent outside the KIC); 80 percent of the firms 
engaged in arm’s-length transactions said they agreed with this sentiment.
5  Haggard, Lee, and Noland (2012) and Haggard and Noland (2012a) obtain similar results regarding weak 
or non-existent mechanisms for resolving non labor-related commercial disputes on the basis of a survey of 
Chinese enterprises operating in North Korea.
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What stands out is the dog that did not bark. There is little statistical correlation between direct 
supervision of workers and knowledge of either workers’ attitudes or their working conditions. 
Direct supervision of workers was uncorrelated with beliefs that workers had to bribe to obtain 
jobs, knowledge of the share of wage payments retained by the government, knowledge of 
worker complaints, or beliefs about their happiness. In fact, firms that directly supervised their 
workers were more likely to complain about inadequate skills. 
Labor Standards
The results of the previous section document labor practices that appear both exploitative and, 
by limiting the extent North Korean workers are exposed to new ways of organizing work (or even 
exposure to South Korean managers), are consequently unlikely to generate the transformational 
effects desired by many observers. The questions then become: Are these conventions 
consistent with the international obligations of the North and South Korean governments? Are 
there mechanisms that could be used to encourage the adoption of more humane and potentially 
transformative practices? 
North Korea is not a member of the International Labor Organization (ILO), and internationally 
recognized core labor standards such as the rights to associate, organize, and bargain 
collectively are notable in their absence. South Korea is a member of the ILO, however, as well as 
of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which has promulgated 
its Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD 2011), which obligate investors to ensure 
that North Korean workers are aware of their rights and how to exercise them. Both countries 
are members of the United Nations, which has released a set of Guiding Principles for Business 
and Human Rights (United Nations 2011). Finally, the South Korean government could extend 
regulation over its investors extraterritorially. Indeed, the constitution of the Republic of Korea 
makes claims over the entire peninsula, raising the question of to what extent South Korean firms 
investing in North Korea ought to be subject to “domestic” standards and regulations. To what 
extent, if any, is the behavior of South Korean investors in North Korea constrained in principle, if 
not in reality, by these covenants?
A basic issue with both the UN and OECD guidelines is that they are largely oriented toward 
prescribing behavior for multinational firms in an environment in which the host government is 
committed to upholding international norms. The guidelines tend to be concerned with situations 
in which firms could exploit the mobility of capital to undercut host government attempts to 
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maintain standards. The problem with their application in the North Korean case is that it is not so 
much that private firms subvert the government’s attempt to do the right thing, but rather that the 
state opposes the international norms, and the investor stands to benefit.
So, for example, the OECD Guidelines state that investors should respect human rights “within 
the framework of internationally recognized human rights, international human rights obligations 
of the countries in which they operate” (OECD 2011, 31), and then go on to reference “the 
International Bill of Human Rights, consisting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
the main instruments through which it has been codified: the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights” and the 
ILO principles (OECD 2011, 32). North Korea is a state party to the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. So, for example, the covenant obligates states to ensure 
“equal opportunity for everyone to be promoted in his employment to an appropriate higher 
level, subject to no considerations other than those of seniority and competence” (Article 7)—an 
obligation eviscerated by North Korea’s songbun system of political classifications (Collins 2012), 
as are the rights of citizens to form and join trade unions of their choice and strike (Article 8). 
The OECD Guidelines would seem to establish both the government of North Korea’s obligation 
under its international commitments to ensure certain rights, as well as the employer’s obligation 
to respect those rights. But the Guidelines go on to say that “obeying domestic laws is the first 
obligation of enterprises … in countries where domestic laws and regulations conflict with the 
principles and standards of the Guidelines, enterprises should seek ways to honor such principles 
and standards to the fullest extent which does not place them in violation of domestic law” (OECD 
2011, 17). In North Korea, the state’s unwillingness to meet its international legal obligations 
would seem to emasculate any salutary impact of the OECD Guidelines.6
However, the Guidelines also specify that adhering countries establish National Contact Points 
(NCPs). The NCPs are primarily oriented toward ensuring the implementation of the OECD 
Guidelines within the host adhering country. They are also tasked, however, with supporting the 
implementation of the guidelines by home country entities in non-adhering countries.
In the case of South Korea, the NCP is Korea Commercial Arbitration Board. Officials there 
indicated that the government, together with the Korean Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
(KCCI), was working to raise the awareness of the OECD Guidelines among South Korean 
companies operating in non-adhering countries. According to Wolman (2010), the NCP has 
6  Some have also suggested that ILO Convention No. 94 and Recommendation No. 84 concerning labor 
clauses in public contracts could be applicable. But neither North nor South Korea are signatories to this 
convention. 
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received several complaints alleging extraterritorial violations of labor rights by South Korean 
firms in countries such as Guatemala and Myanmar, and appears to have instinctively sided with 
the South Korean firms against the complainants. During this period, the NCP was located in the 
Overseas Investment Division, tasked with promoting South Korean business abroad, first in the 
Ministry of Knowledge Economy and then after a governmental reorganization in the Ministry 
of Trade, Industry, and Energy. With the recent relocation of the NCP to the Korea Commercial 
Arbitration Board, perhaps complainants will get a fairer hearing. In any event, the issue of the 
OECD Guidelines had not come up in the context of either the Kaesong Industrial Complex 
or investment in North Korea more generally, and the government had not formulated a policy 
position.
The UN’s Principles face similar difficulties. The first foundational principle is that “States must 
protect against human rights abuse within their territory and/or jurisdiction by third parties, 
including business enterprises” (UN 2011, 6). The text goes on to elaborate principles for 
constraining the operation of firms and ensuring that neither host nor sending state contributes 
to the denial of human rights. But in North Korea, the state itself is the problem, and the UN 
Principles do not address the obligations of firms in such environments. They do suggest, 
however, that at times, states may need to consider extraterritorial application of the law. 
South Korea has generally applied its labor laws extraterritorially only when the complainant is a 
South Korean national working for a South Korean company overseas (Wolman 2012). However, 
Article 3 of the South Korean constitution declares that the territory of the Republic of Korea 
consists of “the Korean Peninsula and its adjacent islands,” establishing a de jure presumption 
of territoriality (Article 103 of the North Korean constitution makes a mirror claim to the entire 
peninsula) and a de facto status of extraterritoriality. The South Korean constitution then goes on 
to elaborate a number of economic rights, including Article 33: “To enhance working conditions, 
workers shall have the right to independent association, collective bargaining and collective 
action.” Article 6a reads: “Treaties duly concluded and promulgated under the Constitution and 
the generally recognized rules of international law shall have the same effect as the domestic 
laws of the Republic of Korea.” To be clear, the labor rights provision has been violated for much 
of South Korea’s history. But one could interpret these articles and other similar provisions 
together with South Korea’s international legal obligations as forming the constitutional basis, 
nationally and internationally, for encouraging, if not requiring, South Korean firms to facilitate 
labor rights in North Korea. For example, a proactive South Korean government could attempt 
to negotiate an amendment of the KIC labor law that would incorporate the core ILO labor 
standards, including the right to freedom of association and collective bargaining, the right to 
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strike, prohibition against sexual discrimination and harassment, and a ban on child labor. The 
government of North Korea would almost certainly reject such a request, but the actual outcome 
would be a function of bargaining.
The obstacle to the extraterritorial application of South Korean law is not the lack of a legal 
foundation, it is that South Korea’s diplomatic commitment to engagement with North Korea 
trumps labor rights concerns, together with the perception of South Korean firms that the North 
Korean status quo confers benefits. That is to say, the South Korean government does not make 
requests to address labor conditions to start with. To date, there is no evidence that the South 
Korean government has undertaken any steps that would encourage or require its firms to abide 
by any standards whatsoever.7
The same calculus does not hold for all of South Korea’s trade partners, however. For example, 
the South Korean request for goods produced in the KIC to be classified as “made in South 
Korea” and receive duty-free treatment was rejected by US negotiators in the Korea-US Free 
Trade Agreement talks. The two sides ultimately adopted a face-saving gesture of creating a 
bilateral commission to study the issue with the tacit understanding that the United States would 
never agree to duty-free treatment under the current economic and political conditions prevailing 
in North Korea. Other free trade agreement partners—Singapore, for example—have acceded 
to the South Korean request. Since the 2013 KIC closure, there have been signs that South 
Korea would like to “internationalize” KIC, the thought being that the presence of firms from third 
countries would deter North Korea from interfering with the operation of the zone (Stangarone 
2013). But another implication of bringing in non-South Korean firms is that those firms may be 
subject to a different set of legal constraints and political pressures than the South Korean firms 
are, as the foregoing examples demonstrate. 
That leaves private activism as a possible remedy. One possibility noted above would be to 
encourage foreign companies investing in North Korea the development of codes of conduct 
similar to that of the Sullivan Principles that were used in South Africa during that country’s 
apartheid period.8 The Principles are named after the Reverend Leon Sullivan, who was 
appointed to the General Motors (GM) board in 1971, becoming the first African-American board 
member of a major US corporation. At the time, GM was the largest employer of non-white South 
7  As Wolman (2010) observes one avenue would be to expand the jurisdictional authority of the (South) 
Korean National Human Rights Commission to address labor rights abuses committed by corporations. At 
present, the Commission does not have the authority to investigate actions by corporations either within or 
outside South Korea, but expanding its remit would be consistent with practices elsewhere.
8  The Sullivan Principles inspired other initiatives such as the MacBride Principles (in Northern Ireland), 
the Slepak Principles (Soviet Union), the Miller Principles (China and Tibet), the Malquiladora Standards of 
Conduct (Mexico), and the Ceres nee Valdez Principles (environment). See McCrudden (1999). 
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Africans, and Sullivan used his position on the GM board to advocate for reform of the apartheid 
system. In 1977, he formulated what came to be known as the Sullivan Principles, aimed at 
remediating racial discrimination in employment practices. Sullivan established an independent 
administrative unit to implement the principles, and recruited the accounting firm Arthur D. Little, 
Inc. to monitor implementation at the company level. 
The introduction and development of the Sullivan Principles occurred symbiotically with a growing 
anti-apartheid movement, which included shareholder resolutions, divestment campaigns, and, 
at the level of state and local governments in the United States, selective purchasing policies 
with respect to government procurement.9 In short, US investors in South Africa came under 
considerable pressure either to adopt the Sullivan Principles or divest. In turn, a burgeoning anti-
apartheid movement and growing frustration over the apparent lack of progress in South Africa 
led Sullivan in 1984 to expand the Principles, adding a provision committing signatory firms to 
“working to eliminate laws and customs that impede social, economic, and political justice.”10 The 
following year, President Ronald Reagan issued an Executive Order requiring firms to abide by 
fair employment standards similar to the Sullivan Principles, but this could not stem the tide, and 
in 1986, the US Congress passed sanctions legislation. 
In a judicious assessment of the impact of the Sullivan Principles, McCrudden (1999) writes, 
There is some indication that the Principles had several positive effects: first, 
that corporations found them useful by providing a focus for their social and 
political activities in South Africa; second, that the Principles brought about 
some changes in conditions for black workers which may not have otherwise 
have occurred; third, that the Principles led to increased funding by companies 
of social causes in the South African community, and fourth, that they may have 
increased pressure on government for the recognition of black trade unions, 
an important factor in the development of organized black politics. It is difficult, 
9  So, for example, the State of Maryland adopted a policy that firms bidding for contracts in excess of 
$100,000 had to certify that either they did no business in South Africa or adhered to the Sullivan Principles.
10  The principles were: 1) Non-segregation of the races in all eating, comfort, and work facilities; 2) Equal 
and fair employment practices for all employees; 3) Equal pay for all employees doing equal or comparable 
work for the same period of time. 4) Initiation of and development of training programs that will prepare, 
in substantial numbers, blacks and other non-whites for supervisory, administrative, clerical, and technical 
jobs. 5) Increasing the number of blacks and other non-whites in management and supervisory positions. 6) 
Improving the quality of life for blacks and other non-whites outside the work environment in such areas as 
housing, transportation, school, recreation, and health facilities. 7) Working to eliminate laws and customs 
that impede social, economic, and political justice (added in 1984). http://www.marshall.edu/revleonsullivan/
principles.htm (accessed November 11, 2013). When this tactic did not bear fruit, eventually Sullivan called 
upon companies to exit South Africa.
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however, for the effect of the Principles to be distinguished from the effect of 
other similar activity, outside the context of the Principles, such as undertaken by 
other countries, or from larger political and economic forces operating at that time 
in South Africa (77). 
One weakness of the monitoring and assessment process was that much of the benchmarking 
was on the input side (e.g., dollars spent on corporate social responsibility projects) rather than 
on the output side (i.e. employment expansion, job training, upward mobility, small-business 
development), where the companies might have had the most capability for making a difference 
(Sethi and Williams 2000).
Nevertheless, the apartheid regime ultimately fell, and in 1999, Sullivan and UN Secretary 
General Kofi Annan formulated the Global Sullivan Principles of Corporate Social Responsibility, 
an antecedent to the UN Principles examined above (see Appendix B).11 In contrast to the UN 
Principles, and consistent with their origins as guidelines for corporate activity, the Global Sullivan 
Principles focus on the behavior of firms, not states. They call for multinational companies to 
proactively advocate for universal human rights and the rights of their employees. And in the 
words of Stephan Haggard, “Nor do the Global Sullivan Principles have the waffling language of 
the OECD guidelines, which open the giant loophole of operating within the constraints of national 
law.”12 
Conclusion 
Most North Koreans are so isolated from the rest of the world that nearly any exposure to 
foreigners and new ways of doing things has to be regarded as positive. Yet the results of this 
survey of South Korean employers suggests that the North Korean government has effectively 
circumscribed exposure of North Korean citizens both to South Koreans and to new, more 
market-oriented economic practices. This appears to be particularly true in the KIC, where 
activities are subject to much greater political scrutiny than activities outside its bounds. South 
Korean managers work through North Korean counterparts whose main function appears to 
be control and monitoring of the workforce. Labor mobility and the operation of labor-market 
incentives are blunted by the administrative control of appointments and the capture of bonuses 
11  Reproduced in Appendix B. Accessed November 11, 2013, http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/links/sullivan-
principles.html. 
12  Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, “Foreign Investment in North Korea: What Obligations Do Firms 
Have?” North Korea: Witness to Transformation, May 23, 2011, http://www.piie.com/blogs/nk/?p=1405 
(accessed November 7, 2013).
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and incentive pay. Perhaps not surprisingly, the labor market practices of South Korean firms 
operating in North Korea appear similar to those obtaining elsewhere in the North Korean 
economy. 
The apparent detachment of South Korean employers is consistent with an “Ugly Korean” 
narrative that arose as South Korean multinational firms made their initial forays into Southeast 
Asia as they were accused of various abusive labor practices (Wolman 2010).13 A majority of 
the South Korean employers report that their North Korean operations are profitable and frankly 
appear to value the docility of their non-unionized North Korean workers. Given the constellation 
of interests between the North Korean state and the South Korean employers, it is doubtful that 
much impetus to improve the working conditions of North Korean workers will come from these 
sources.
Instead, if internationally recognized labor standards are to be achieved in these North Korean 
institutions, it is likely to require action by the South Korean government. This begs the question 
of whether the South Korean government’s passivity on this score reflects the interests of South 
Korean firms, or as some might argue, the firms simply conform to the framework established by 
the North and South Korean governments.
Some observers would favor using a multilateral interstate obligation such as the OECD 
Guidelines as the foundation for such a policy. The problem is that the existing interstate 
agreements are weak or poorly suited for the case at hand. And in the Korean case, existing 
constitutional claims probably establish an equally compelling basis for policy as the multilateral 
obligations.
Even if one accepts the need to root policy in an existing state obligation however, as a tactical 
matter, public pressure directed at companies based on existing voluntary codes is likely to be a 
necessary precursor to state action. Admittedly, in the case at hand, firms’ scope for implementing 
voluntary codes, perhaps modeled on the Global Sullivan Principles, would be significantly 
constrained by the North Korean government. But as the example of apartheid-era South 
Africa demonstrates, it is possible for businesses to make marginal improvements in working 
conditions, even in the context of a highly repressive legal environment, if sufficient pressure is 
brought to bear. However, as the history of the Sullivan Principles makes clear, much of its impact 
was derived from public and political pressure to adopt more drastic divestiture and sanctions 
13  See, for example, Asia Monitor Resource Centre. Describing the operations of Korean employers in 
Indonesia, two NGOs write, “Workers’ opinions on Korean employers are that they were the worst employers 
who mostly refuse to negotiate and infringe labor rights” (271).
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solutions, which encouraged both the companies and political defenders of engagement to take 
implementation of the Principles seriously. This is to say that the impact of voluntary codes cannot 
be viewed statically in isolation, but as part of a broader political process that may ultimately 
involve state-mandated action.
Such a shift in stance toward active policy is only likely to come if the South Korean public 
agitates for it. The absence of any kind of coherent human rights campaigning among South 
Korean progressives is notable,14 but a campaign organized around workers’ rights, anchored 
in both the South Korean constitution and existing international norms and covenants, would 
not be a bad place to start. While there is a broad political consensus within South Korea as 
to the desirability of economic engagement with North Korea,15 an appropriately calibrated set 
of principles could be more than a poison pill designed to end engagement. Such principles 
could center on providing for basic labor rights, recognition of labor organizations, and non-
discrimination on the basis of songbun. But to be clear, the history of the Sullivan Principles 
demonstrates that whatever positive impact the initiative had occurred symbiotically against a 
backdrop of divestiture, selective purchasing, and sanctions campaigns and policies. Application 
of voluntary labor standards in North Korea would presumably require a similar political context 
and in all likelihood would eventually require negotiations between the governments of North and 
South Korea to reform the labor practices of South Korean firms operating in North Korea.
14  See Wolman (2013). 
15  Marcus Noland, “South Korean Attitudes Toward North-South Cooperation,” North Korea: Witness to 
Transformation, September 20, 2013, http://www.piie.com/blogs/nk/?p=11728 (accessed December 9, 
2013). 
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Appendix A. Survey Methodology
A pilot survey was conducted in November 2009 using a survey instrument designed by the 
authors, with the actual interviews conducted by Millward Brown Media Research. Millward Brown 
was responsible for securing any local permits and ensuring that the survey was conducted 
according to ESOMAR rules (http://actrav.itcilo.org/actrav-english/telearn/global/ilo/guide/iccmar.
htm). The final survey was conducted during November 2009 and March 2010. The predominant 
means of conducting the survey was through telephone interviews, though some interviews 
were conducted face-to-face. Among the reasons that interviews could not be conducted were 
refusal by the enterprise to participate prior to or during the interview, inability to establish contact 
with the enterprise, and the unavailability of the person within the enterprise eligible to respond 
according to the survey instrument (chairman, manager, etc.). The data—and particularly firm 
addresses—were subject to post-survey verification by random spot-checking.
Given that there are no known or available registries of all firms doing business with North Korea, 
the sample of firms doing business with North Korea was of necessity a sample of convenience. 
The sample was developed using North Korean, South Korean, and Western press accounts, as 
well as information gathered by Millward Brown in the process of the pilot and during interviews 
with other firms. The sample was drawn from enterprises operating throughout South Korea, 
including the control group of firms not doing business in North Korea.
The design involved a survey of 250 firms, with 200 doing business in North Korea and 50 not 
doing business in North Korea; in the end, we had responses from 50 firms not doing business in 
North Korea and 199 firms doing business in North Korea. We defined firms doing business with 
North Korea to include those that were involved in trading (import, export, or both), investment, 
or processing on commission activities, or that maintained representative offices in North Korea. 
Also included were 18 firms that had done business and had quit. The control group consisted of 
50 firms that had never done business with North Korea. 
The survey began with a pilot of 50 firms from throughout South Korea. Although it was 
understood this was a sample of convenience, enterprises reflecting a broad distribution of 
size, sector, and provincial location were targeted. Following the successful completion of the 
pilot, which did not require fundamental modification of the survey, we were able to transit 
directly to the full survey, and all of the pilot firms were included in the final 249 firms. Once the 
sample of 199 enterprises operating in North Korea was completed, our aim was to select 50 
firms without business relationships with North Korea but with similar qualities with the firms in 
our treatment group of firms engaged in business with North Korea (198 firms, excluding one 
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foreign-owned firm). Not all quality variables were available for comparison. We first teased out 
the firms engaged in the manufacturing sector, since the majority of our treatment group was 
in the manufacturing sector. The variables of the two groups were then adjusted so that their 
categorizations would be comparable with each other. The variables (regions, firm ownership, 
and firm size) were dummified, and we applied the CEM (Coarsened Exact Matching) method in 
STATA to identify 199 matching firms. We provided a list of 199 firms, as lower response rates 
were expected, and of those, 50 firms were ultimately selected for our control group. 
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Appendix B. The Global Sullivan Principles
THE PREAMBLE
The objectives of the Global Sullivan Principles are to support economic, social and political 
justice by companies where they do business; to support human rights and to encourage equal 
opportunity at all levels of employment, including racial and gender diversity on decision making 
committees and boards; to train and advance disadvantaged workers for technical, supervisory 
and management opportunities; and to assist with greater tolerance and understanding among 
peoples; thereby, helping to improve the quality of life for communities, workers and children with 
dignity and equality.
I urge companies large and small in every part of the world to support and follow the Global 
Sullivan Principles of corporate social responsibility wherever they have operations.
~ The Reverend Leon H. Sullivan
THE PRINCIPLES
As a company which endorses the Global Sullivan Principles we will respect the law, and as 
a responsible member of society we will apply these Principles with integrity consistent with 
the legitimate role of business. We will develop and implement company policies, procedures, 
training and internal reporting structures to ensure commitment to these principles throughout our 
organization. We believe the application of these Principles will achieve greater tolerance and 
better understanding among peoples, and advance the culture of peace.
Accordingly, we will:
Express our support for universal human rights and, particularly, those of our employees, the 
communities within which we operate, and parties with whom we do business. 
Promote equal opportunity for our employees at all levels of the company with respect to issues 
such as color, race, gender, age, ethnicity or religious beliefs, and operate without unacceptable 
worker treatment such as the exploitation of children, physical punishment, female abuse, 
involuntary servitude, or other forms of abuse.
Respect our employees’ voluntary freedom of association.
28 |     MARCUS NOLAND
LABOR STANDARDS AND SOUTH KOREAN EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES IN NORTH KOREA
Compensate our employees to enable them to meet at least their basic needs and provide 
the opportunity to improve their skill and capability in order to raise their social and economic 
opportunities.
Provide a safe and healthy workplace; protect human health and the environment; and promote 
sustainable development.
Promote fair competition including respect for intellectual and other property rights, and not offer, 
pay or accept bribes.
Work with government and communities in which we do business to improve the quality of life 
in those communities—their educational, cultural, economic and social well-being—and seek to 
provide training and opportunities for workers from disadvantaged backgrounds.
Promote the application of these principles by those with whom we do business.
We will be transparent in our implementation of these principles and provide information which 
demonstrates publicly our commitment to them.
US-KOREA INSTITUTE AT SAIS    | 29
LABOR STANDARDS AND SOUTH KOREAN EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES IN NORTH KOREA
Appendix C. Figures and Tables
Tables and Figures
N = 46
A2. Sold SK products to NK in 2008 
(6.5%)
A2. Bought products from NK in 2008 
(19.6%)
A2. Process Trade in 2008
(71.7%)
Located in Kaesong
(71.7%)
2
(4.3%)
3
(6.5%)
8
(17.4%)
5
(10.9%)
25
(54.3%)
Figure 1. Modalities of firms that employ North Korean labor
2
(4.3%)
1
(2.2%)
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52%
91% 91%
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70%
80%
90%
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North Korean workers had adequate skills for
my business.
North Korean workers had skills comparable to
Chinese, Vietnamese and other foreign
workers.
Given skill level of workers, labor costs in
North Korea provided our business with
advantage.
% Total Firms Agree (n=46) % KIC Firms Agree (n=33) % Non-KIC Firms Agree (n=13)
Figure 2. Firm opinions on quality of North Korean labor
Note: Bars represent percent of firms out of sub-sample that responded positively to the corresponding survey question. Positive responses aggregate 'Agree" and "Totally agree."
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North Koreans considered themselves lucky to
have worked in my factory
North Korean workers complained about
conditions in South Korean-operated factories.
A benefit of hiring North Korean workers was
that the percentage of workers who quit was
low.
% Total Firms Agree (n=46) % KIC Firms Agree (n=33) % Non-KIC Firms Agree (n=13)
Note: Bars represent percent of firms out of sub-sample that responded positively to the corresponding survey question. Positive responses aggregate 'Agree" and "Totally agree."
Figure 3. Firm opinions on North Korean worker satisfaction
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Frequency % Frequency % Frequency % Frequency % Frequency %
Directly 1 2% 0 0% 1 8% 0 0% 1 20%
From a North Korean 
government labor agency
38 83% 31 94% 7 54% 7 88% 0 0%
Our North Korean partners 
supply the workers
5 11% 1 3% 4 31% 1 13% 3 60%
Other 2 4% 1 3% 1 8% 0 0% 1 20%
Total 46 100% 33 100% 13 100% 8 100% 5 100%
Table 1. Methods of hiring North Korean labor
NK Employee Hiring Method
Total KIC (n=33) Non-KIC (n=13) POC (n=8) Arms-Length (n=5)
Frequency % Total Frequency %  KIC Frequency %  Non-KIC Frequency %  POC Frequency
% Arms 
Length
Pay hourly wages 41 89% 31 94% 10 77% 6 75% 4 80%
Make piece-work 
payments to North Korean 
labor
7 15% 4 12% 3 23% 2 25% 1 20%
Make overtime payments 
to North Korean labor
10 22% 9 27% 1 8% 1 13% 0 0%
Make bonus payments to 
North Korean labor
3 7% 2 6% 1 8% 1 13% 0 0%
Note: Firms able to choose all compensation methods that apply. 
Table 2. Types of Payments to North Korean Workers 
Arms Length (n=5)
Compensation Methods 
Practiced
Total (n=46) KIC (n=33) Non-KIC (n=13) POC (n=8)
Frequency % Total Frequency % KIC Frequency % Non-KIC Frequency % POC Frequency % Arms Length
Dismissal Methods
Made severance payment 1 2% 1 3% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
Get permission from North Korean labor agency 24 52% 20 61% 4 31% 3 38% 1 20%
Get permission from North Korean partner 3 7% 1 3% 2 15% 1 13% 1 20%
Get permission from KWP 3 7% 3 9% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
Get permission from South Korean government 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
Required no permissions or approvals 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
Replacement Methods
Dismissed worker and hired a new one 1 2% 1 3% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
Dismissed worker and asked North Korean 
government labor agency to supply new one
22 48% 18 55% 4 31% 4 50% 0 0%
Dismissed worker and asked North Korean 
partner to hire new one
2 4% 1 3% 1 8% 0 0% 1 20%
Never hired an unsatisfactory worker 13 28% 7 21% 6 46% 4 50% 4 80%
Note: Firms could choose all responses that apply.
Table 3. Dismissal and replacement methods for unsatisfactory North Korean workers
Methods of Dealing with Unsatisfactory 
Workers
Total (n=46) KIC (n=33) Non-KIC (n=13) POC (n=8) Arms-Length (n=5)
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